On Wednesday 5 February 1986, the Section of Epidemiology and Community Medicine held a half-day symposium on 'Iatrogenic diseases -identification and monitoring'. Fifty people attended the meeting. Major General J P Crowdy, President of the Section, welcomed members and guests and introduced the Chairman, Professor M Vessey of the University of Oxford.
The first speaker, Mr H B Devlin (Consultant Surgeon, North Tees General Hospital), spoke on 'Do surgeons do harm?' Surgeons, like the rest of the medical profession, have a responsibility to the public and the profession to assess surgical outcome and standards of care. This can be achieved by audit and help to improve medical care, value of procedures and future developments. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the measure of outcome from any surgical procedure will depend on clinical, social, economic and political factors. It has been shown that death rates following surgical procedures, for example cholecystectomy, treatment of fractured femur and hernia repair, can be very variable. The Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and the Associations of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland have set up a confidential enquiry into perioperative deaths (deaths up to 30 days following surgery). The pattern is not unlike the Confidential Enquiry into Maternal Deaths, with confidentiality of data, independence of the surgical operation team and authoritative assessment. At present three NHS regions are participating and the compliance rate is 96%. Surprisingly, most surgeons have shown enthusiasm for the exercise and seem to enjoy the self criticism entailed in completing the report form. Preliminary findings show that few surgical units have regular, in-house quality assurance meetings, the post-mortem rate is low, and many coroners do not send autopsy reports on postoperative deaths to the relevant anaesthetists and surgeons -thus negating the value of the coroner's autopsy.
Dr John Harris (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Department of Education, University of Manchester) addressed the question 'Iatrogenic illness -who's responsible?' He felt that iatrogenic illness poses no special ethical problems, but this does not mean that it poses no problems at all. He outlined two separate but connected problems. The first concerns the actual concept of iatrogenesis, a problem somewhat deeper than one of mere semantics. 'Iatrogenesis', strictly a condition 'born of or produced by the physician', is generally accepted as a condition 'occurring as a result of treatment by a physician'. Definitions of 'treatment' may pose further problems, as may definition of illness resulting from treatment by a paramedical or non-medical person. To really understand the meaning of a concept we need to go beyond defining it-we need to understand the point of it: why are we interested in the idea and what is its value? With iatrogenesis the point is to assess the scope of the ways in which people may be adversely affected by the practice of medicine, so that these adverse affects may be limited so far as is possible. Thus the definition needs to be wide.
Having accepted this, it is clear that responsibility for iatrogenesis must lie with all health practitioners, not just doctors, and with anyone, not just patients, adversely affected by the practice of medicine.
The second problem concerns the scope of'responsibility for iatrogenesis, which covers four dimensions. First, the responsibility for omission: failure to inter. vene appropriately may lead to iatrogenesia But this is only true if there is a failure to use a treatment that is known to alleviate the disease. Thus the patient's condition cannot be attributed to iatrogenesis if there is a failure to discover a treatment, unless of course no effort is being made to find a treatment. Iatrogenesis, furthermore, is not associated with blame, nor with the moral rectitude of the practitioner. If conditions worse than death are allowed to persist and death is the only alternative, continued existence under such conditions is an example of iatrogenesis.
Second, the responsibility for predictable consequences depends on informed consent, and the practitioner's only chance to evade moral responsibility for predictable iatrogenesis is to obtain fully informed consent. Ifthe patient is incapable through age, infirmity or coma to give such consent, then only ifthe known benefits of treatment outweigh the risks can treatment be given. Third, the moral responsibility for unforseeable consequences may not be that of the practitioner, but awareness of this may lead to a cavalier attitude on the part of the practitioner to risks considered small or insignificant. But it must be emphasized that it is the patient who is to judge whether a risk, however small, is worth taking.
Finally, there is a responsibility for negligence. Clearly, iatrogenic illness resulting from the negligence ofa practitioner is that practitioner's responsibility, whether the negligence was in the treatment given, in the decision to treat (or not), or in the failure to obtain an informed consent. The Royal Society of Medicine 10690 were from single and 42 995 from 9059 multiple users. Most users were general practitioners, which is not surprising as they issue 80% of prescriptions. Reports from hospital doctors contained a proportionately higher percentage of fatal adverse drug reactions than reports from general practitioners. In a three-month study in 1983 it was found that those qualified for 6--15 years were more likely to use the yellow card system. More women than men patients were reported. Over the years 1978-82 compared with 1973-77, there was a higher rate of increase in reporting for patients under one year of age and also in the very elderly (over 75 years) than in other age groups. Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs accounted for 24% of reports.
In Europe, ADR schemes and registers operate. The highest rates of reporting were in Denmark (400 per 10 6 population per annum), Sweden (300) and the UK (about 260). In Australia, Belgium and Canada, hospital doctors reported most ADRs, while in Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the UK, general practitioners reported most. In Germany, Italy and the USA, most reports came from industry. Fatality rates varied, being under 2% in Australia and Italy, 2-4% in Denmark, Finland and Ireland, 6--8% in New Zealand, and 10% in the USA.
The highest number of prescriptions per capita per year was in the USA. It has been found that countries with higher numbers of prescriptions have lower rates of reporting, suggesting that the more drugs are used, the less likely are GPs to report. In general, all countries grossly under-report ADRs; it is also difficult to make comparisons, as they have different data bases. National differences in drug use showing qualitative and quantitative reporting of ADRs have been influenced by a number of factors not directly related to the product. These may include media and monitoring bias. Extrapolation of inter-country data is not justified, nor is 'lumping data' together. For Britain it is important to encourage doctors to report and use the yellow cards in order to act as an early alert system. Further details of voluntary systems of adverse drug reaction reporting have been published by Dr Griffin and Dr J C P WeberI •
Professor M D Rawlins (University of Newcastle
Upon Tyne) discussed 'Risk-benefit assessment in drug therapy'. While recognizing that there is no drug that is absolutely safe, balancing risk and benefit in drug therapy requires separate analyses of benefit and risk, together with an assessment of the 'trade-off' between them.
The assessment of benefit is based on preclinical and clinical pharmacological studies, premarketing clinical trials, and postmarketing trials. Pharmacological investigations are a good predictor of therapeutic benefit in many circumstances, but clinical trials are invariably necessary for the formal assessment of clinical efficacy, and of comparative efficacy with other drugs with similar therapeutic actions. Postmarketing trials are usually limited to the study of new 'indications', and in the evaluation of prophylactic efficacy (such as antihypertensive and hypolipidaemic agents).
The assessment of risk is based on studies of animal pharmacology and toxicology, on the results of clinical trials, and also on postmarketing surveillance. Animal pharmacology and toxicology studies can identify many drug hazards, but are poor preventors of risk. Clinical trials may identify new hazards and provide some estimate of risk, but they are limited by their short duration and relatively small numbers of exposed patients. Increasing importance is therefore being given to various methods of postmarketing surveillance (including spontaneous reporting, case-control studies and cohort methods such as prescription-event monitoring).
In an imperfect world, how does one attempt to balance benefit, where reasonable measures are available, against risk, where methods require considerable development? Risk-benefit assessment can be made by formal, comparative, or judgmental analysis. Formal analysis involves the summation of risks and benefits to provide a quantitative basis for assessment. Methods include large-scale trials (e.g. the WHO clofibrate study), and the construction of balance sheets from independent estimates of risk and benefit (e.g. oral contraceptives, whooping cough vaccination). Problems with formal analysis include assigning appropriate values to both benefits and risks. However, a risk-benefit assessment for the community may not be reliable for managing individual patients. Moreover 'statistical benefit' may not be very compelling to individuals who have experienced serious ADRs. Comparative analysis requires comparisons of risks between drugs, and assumes that current risks are acceptable. This method is difficult to apply to drugs with unequal benefits and it assumes that the status quo is satisfactory. Judgment involves the subjective 'trade-off' of benefits and risks by the assignment of intuitive values to each. Coarse judgment is made by any regulating authorities, but finer judgment must depend on the skill of individual prescribing doctors.
Judgment, however, is subjective and easily perturbed by personal bias or prejudice, as well as external pressures from patient, peer groups or pharmaceutical manufacturers. In exercising judgment, prescribers need to become more familiar with its limitations, and more ready to accept criticism.
A paper on 'Reye's syndrome and aspirin' by Dr Susan Hall, which was also presented at this symposium, has been published in full (see October 1986 JRSM, pp 596--8).
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